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When a 260-year-old regime comes toppling down, how do you organize society after the
fall? That is the challenge that faced members of the Meiji state after the end of the Tokugawa
Bakufu. The need for internal unity and the pressure of Western Imperialism, as imposed by the
Unequal Treaties,1 raised the stakes of the Meiji State’s goal: to create a modern nation-state
with a unifying national identity. What did that process entail? First, create a legal precedent for
control and monopolize violence. Second, define the individual because a nation needs a public,
and a public cannot exist without people. Third, negotiate the relationship between the freedom
of the individual and the power of the State in the connective process of state-building. Frictions
between individual and state, single or multiple, and truth or the absence of it emerged. This
thesis argues that fighting over those tensions became the defining act of modernity and the
foundation of Meiji Japan.
This project analyzes the ways individuals relate to their community because it is often
taken for granted that this is a naturally occurring process. This thesis aims to answer the
question of how underlying contradictions contributed to the formation of a modern nation-state.
Additionally, some scholars previously suggested that there are good or bad ways to modernize a
nation, and used Japan and Germany as examples of “bad” given their fall into Fascism.
Historian Erik Grimmer-Solem summarized the trend of historiography to use Germany and
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Before the rise of the Meiji state, Commodore Perry of the United States negotiated the first of the Unequal
Treaties with Japan in 1854, several European nations following soon after. Historian Michael R. Auslin
summarized the treaties as, “...contained provisions for extraterritoriality, denied the Japanese the freedom to set
their own tariff rates, and they included most-favored nation (MFN) status for the Western signatories but not the
Japanese.” The Unequal Treaties put Japan at a distinct economic disadvantage in increasingly global trade
relations. Such an economic disadvantage posed the risk of further vulnerability to Western Imperialism, and the
potential for destabilization within Japan. If the Meiji state hoped to protect Japan from further encroachment of
Western nation-states it would need to achieve a level of modernization that Western-nation states would be forced
to recognize as a worthy of renegotiating treaties on more equal terms.
Please see Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese
Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2-71
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Japan as examples of modernization that broke from the liberal-democratic path, “A number of
these German influences would justify authoritarian, statist, semi-feudal, and nativist tendencies
in Meiji Japan, thereby reinforcing Japanese peculiarity and deviance from liberal-democratic
patterns of development.”2 This project resists the tendency to split the making of a modern
nation-state into oversimplified categories of “good” or “bad.” This thesis does not read from
World War II backward, or accept Japan’s progress through the Meiji period and beyond as an
inevitability. Those previous methods rob the history of the dynamic intersections and dialogues
that shaped the way people experienced their relationship to “nation.” Instead, this project
addresses the dialogues surrounding how the concepts of authority, individualism, and nation
functioned in Meiji era Japan. To accomplish this, I tracked the relationships between different
people, ideas, and the authority of the community through politics, intellectual debate, and
literature. I combined these elements to demonstrate that not only are each of these areas
connected, they were always a part of each other. None of them could have occurred the way
they did without the influence of the others because they existed within the same space and
thought. To make that clear, I will peel back the layers of creating a national identity. 3
Prior to the Meiji State, the Tokugawa Bakufu controlled Japan for around 260 years. The
Tokugawa Bakufu was a military government, based on the hereditary samurai class, led by the
Shogun. The Tokugawa Bakufu maintained a closed country policy severely restricting contact
with outside nations. It worked off the Bakuhan system where feudal lords resided over semiautonomous domains called hans. In this system, the identity of the public defined the
2

Erik Grimmer-Solem, "German Social Science, Meiji Conservatism, and the Peculiarities of Japanese History."
Journal of World History 16, no. 2 (2005): 189.
3
This project breaks with a vein of historiography that emerged in the 1970s, tying Germany and Japan together to
explain how the breaking from a standard path of modernization rooted in liberal-democratic tendencies led to
fascist regimes. This project weaves together themes and ideas addressed in works such as Japan’s Modern Myths
by Carol Gluck, Dawn to the West by Donald Keene, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature by Karatani Kōjin, and
Making a Moral Society by Richard M. Reitan.
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individual’s subjectivity around one's relationship to their specific community (often han), and
the relationship of that community to the Bakufu. After abolishing the Bakuhan system, the Meiji
State sought to replace it with a new national identity by redefining systems of power, the public,
and the agency of the individual within the nation. Part of that redefining process included
gathering information from around the world. Integrating ideology from abroad promised a path
to create the foundation of the nation-state that Meiji leaders desired, but that same importation
chafed against the past that the Meiji state tried (and never completely succeeded) to separate
itself from. State leaders had to wrestle the unifying control they desired away from the rubble of
the Tokugawa Bakufu, and weave it into the very nature of the public that the nation required.
I.

Writing a Public Fit for the Nation
First, the Meiji state had to set the legal precedent for its authority to exercise that

unifying power. The Charter Oath of 1868 was the first attempt to create that legal foundation.
This document served as Meiji leaders’ attempt to solidify power after troops from the Satsuma
and Chōshū domains overtook the Imperial Palace and declared an “imperial restoration” in
defeating the reign of the military government of the Tokugawa Bakufu.4 The term “imperial
restoration” claimed that the defeat of Tokugawa forces restored the emperor to his proper
position as the heart of the state. The heart of the Meiji state still required a body though, a
public body. To create that public, state leaders needed to incorporate the people into the new
state, and encourage their involvement in its success. The Charter Oath states:
By this oath, we set up as our aim the establishment of the national weal on a
broad basis and the framing of a constitution and laws.
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“Letter of Resignation of the Last Shogun.” in Sources of Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000. 2nd ed. Vol. 2,
comps. William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann (New York: Columbia University Press,
2001), 670.
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1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters
decided by public discussion.
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the
administration of affairs of state.
3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials
shall each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may
be no discontent.
4. Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based
upon the just laws of Nature.
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to
strengthen the foundations of imperial rule.
[Meiji boshin, pp. 81-81; McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, p.8] 5
While public involvement in the state appealed to shades of democracy, incorporating the public
into the state structure provided a function other than representation. By outlining the role that
the public should play in assemblies, administration, and pursuing a “calling,” the state
effectively claimed the public as a part of the legal body of the state. In subsuming the public, the
writers of the Charter Oath not only tried to consolidate their public, but also set the foundation
for monopolizing violence by establishing the state as the centralizing authority of these
assemblies and affairs. State leaders tried to sever the past systems of the Tokugawa Bakufu
from the present by associating previous practices with “evil,” and not being based on the “just
laws of nature.” State leaders did violence to public memory to attempt to separate the people
from their prior identities and push them towards a new national identity. The Meiji state-makers
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“The Charter Oath,” in Sources of Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000. 2nd ed. Vol. 2, comps. William Theodore de
Bary, Carol Gluck, and Arthur E. Tiedemann (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 672.
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defamiliarized the structure of the Tokugawa Bakufu as something inherently negative; both the
individuals and the state had to avoid those past policies for the good of the nation and the
public.
The writers of the Charter Oath drew a clear line in the sand. That line outlined the public
and helped distance Meiji leaders from their own ironic participation in the various cliques of the
Tokugawa’s Bakuhan system.6 The Charter Oath worked to manufacture a safe distance from the
recent past to reduce the strength of that history’s influence on the present moment. The Meiji
state promised a nation where people of all classes would enjoy equality and participation in
government affairs. The Meiji state-leaders also encouraged the association of the new state with
the “knowledge” that they intended to carefully curate from around the world for the betterment
of Japan. Words like “just” and “nature” implied that the Meiji state replaced a system of unjust
and unnatural practices. On the other side of the line, the Charter Oath alluded to the
consequences of slipping back into the practices of Tokugawa Bakufu. The document offered no
specific threat, but by contrasting all the positive benefits of the Meiji state with the “evil” of the
past, state-leaders planted the seed of a threat. The Meiji state’s community excluded those who
engaged in those condemned practices. The Charter Oath’s underlying threat of inclusion versus
exclusion from the community of nation shored up the state’s solidification of its right to
monopolize violence. State-leaders branded that violence as an engine for the type of progress
the nation needed to defend itself from Western Imperialism and the internal fracturing that
contributed to the fall of the Tokugawa Bakufu.
Three years after the Charter Oath, the Meiji state made good on its promise to gather
information from around the world to strengthen the nation. To kick start that project the Meiji
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E.H. Norman, Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman, edited by John W.
Dower (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 162-4.
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state sent many of its leaders, including Iwakura Tomomi, Okubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi,
Itō Hirobumi, and Kume Kunitake, abroad to the United States and Europe on the Iwakura
Mission in 1872-3. The mission had several goals. One, to gather information on state-building
tactics, military structure, and educational institutions. Two, spread recognition of the Meiji State
and the “restored” Meiji emperor. Three, renegotiate the economically unfair treaties imposed by
the United States and several European nations.7 The information acquired on this mission
served as a foundation for the Meiji state’s policy-making, including educational and
constitutional models. The mission provided another knife for the Meiji State to use to try to cut
itself free from the past. First, state delegates needed to sharpen that blade using the various stops
the mission made.
Germany was one of the key stops that Kume identified in his reports. Germany’s
emergence as a player for major power unsettled many of its European neighbors but made it a
promising source of information on industrializing quickly. The Iwakura Mission visited not
only governmental institutions in Germany, but also a military museum, an armory, and
factories.8 The mission made similar stops in other nations. Studying military, legal procedures,
and economic systems provided references for the processes that create the growth outlined in
the Charter Oath. Namely, the growth Japan needed to gain the wealth and stability need to
maintain itself against imperialism. The mission served another function: clarifying the position
of individuals and community.
The treatment the members of the Iwakura mission received while in Germany served as
an example of diplomacy that helped define how people relate to one another when they are a
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Ian Nish ed, The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment. (Abingdon: Japan Library, 1998):
2-4.
8
Ibid, 119.

7

part of different communities (nations). The delegates on the Iwakura Mission were not the only
Japanese studying in Germany. Kume reported, “...that the Japanese students were able to appear
at the railway station in large numbers, because the teachers had given them leave. And the
teachers did so, because they revered their Emperor and wished to act in the same way as him,
greeting the Japanese mission.”9 This gathering of school students showed a specific Japanese
subjectivity coming to light, or at least the appearance of one. The students were not just any
students that came to see the Iwakura Mission, they were Japanese students. The implication is
that there was a sense of identification between students and the delegates the Iwakura Mission;
that they were all Japanese people in Germany. The students meeting other Japanese while
abroad reinforced their identification with a sense of “Japaneseness.” They encountered men
who were a part of the same community as them, which demonstrated how individuals learn how
to relate to their community through others within it. Furthermore, the German people acted in
reference to Emperor Wilhelm I in their treatment of the delegates of the Iwakura Mission. The
German people identified the Japanese delegates as an “other” within Germany, thus
contributing both to what it meant to be German and to what it meant to be Japanese. The
Iwakura delegates brought home the political and legal ideologies they sought out, and a
sharpened sense of national identity.
The findings of the Iwakura Mission and the Meiji States’ current policy did not,
however, provide an entirely satisfactory answer to the question of how to define the public’s
relation to the state. The Charter Oath provided a legal definition of that relationship, but
intellectuals debated the principles underlying the legal construction. The people that made up
the public had to be theoretically defined for the project started by the Charter Oath to work. The
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Meiji Six Society, a group intellectuals interested in promoting Western learning, took on this
debate in their 1874-5 journal the Meirokuzasshi, or Meiji Six Journal. The Meiji Six Society
wrote about a range of topics, but much of their work focused on concerns over the state of the
Meiji Government. They debated different methods of bringing the people and the government
into unity with each other. This unity was necessary to both progress and security, although what
precisely those things looked like differed. Historian Carol Gluck writes, “Although the
definitions both of the task and of the threat were vastly different depending on the group
elaborating them, the collective call was to the people, who lacked, it was said, an adequately
developed, ‘sense of nation.’”10 The Meiji Six Society recognized the state’s desire to
consolidate its power and stability by teaching the people to have a greater “sense of nation.”
That “sense of nation,” could only be taught through interacting with the state’s community of
“nation.” The Meiji Six Society disagreed on the nature of individuals as a part of the state.
For one, Meiji Six members expressed different views on the line between the people and
the state. Fukuzawa Yukichi argued for the establishing the power of the people as a force
standing “side by side” with the government.11 Fukuzawa saw the people and the government as
separate; two entities standing beside each other. Mori Arinori criticized Fukuzawa’s “side by
side” argument stating that, “Should you ask who the people are, the term signifies persons who
possess rights associated with obligations that involve responsibilities. Officials, aristocrats, and
commoners, therefore, are all included in the people.”12 While Fukuzawa drew a line between
the government and those outside it, Mori did not. Mori claimed that every person on the land
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Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 23.
Mori Arinori, “Criticism of the Essay on the Role of Scholars.” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the
Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi
and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 23
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registers of Japan had their obligations as a Japanese national regardless of their specific position
within the country.13 This difference in Fukuzawa and Mori’s views showed the struggle of
defining the relationship between the public and the state. Do the government and the people
influence each other from different sides of a division? Does that influence instead come from
within an overarching community of “Japan?” These questions remained beneath the debate over
how to define the public. That definition impacted how influence and power flowed. Meiji Six
scholars addressed how education and participation in government impacted unity and authority
as a potential answer.
Two opposing viewpoints emerged from that debate: memorialists and gradualists. The
memorialists advocated for public assembly as a means of bringing the people to enlightenment,
while the gradualists argued the nature of the people had to be “enlightened” before they should
have the power to fully participate in government.14 These views stood on different sides of the
thin line between the freedom of the individual and the authority of the state. The tension
between how intellectuals defined this relationship questioned several factors: the direction
power flows, the legitimacy of the ideologies the state based its authority on, and the agency of
the public. For example, gradualist Katō Hiroyuki wrote, “Yet the state’s power must ultimately
be undermined if there is a great excess of ‘liberalism.’ A nation can never survive once the state
power has been undermined.”15 Katō tended to favor Austro-German models of the relationship
between state and people. Gradualists like Katō feared that too much freedom for individuals
would weaken the state’s power and render it ineffectual. If that were to happen, the community
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William Reynolds Braisted. “Introduction,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William
Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976): xvii-xlviii
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Katō Hiroyuki, “In Response to Fukuzawa,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William
Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi and Kikuchi Yuji. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 22.
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of nation itself would crumble without the authority of the state to hold it together. To avoid this
disintegration, the state had to educate the people to think of themselves as a part of Japan’s
public as their primary identity. The state had to install the specific rules and values of the
relationship between individual and community, between public and nation. Without this
education, the state ran a heightened risk of the people using their participation to undermine the
very community they were a part of.
On the opposing side, memorialists maintained that the people had to learn through
participation. From this view, the freedom of individuals strengthened the unity of the nation.
Memorialist Tsuda Mamichi advocated for freedom of the press using language complimentary
to the practices of Britain and America. He wrote, “Civilized peoples escape from the reins with
which barbarian governments oppress men. The distinction between civilization and barbarian
can only be viewed in terms of whether the people have or have not freedom of speech and
conduct.”16 The words “civilization” and “barbarian” are highly politicized terms. They denote a
hierarchy of power both within and outside of the society in question. A “barbarian” government
oppresses its people while a “civilized” one allows for “freedom of speech and conduct.” In the
“barbarous” situation the state consumes the rights of the people down to nothingness while
undermining its own legitimacy among other nations.
A “barbarous” nation could never stand on the same playing field as civilized nations
according to the rationale behind Western Imperialism and the Unequal Treaties.17 The
relationship between “barbarian” versus “civilized” was one that granted the “civilized” the
authority to exert power over the “barbarian.” Taking this into consideration, Tsuda believed that

16

Mamichi Tsuda, “Criticism of the Essay on the Role of Scholars,” in Meiroku Zasshi: Journal of the
Japanese Enlightenment, ed. Braisted, William Reynolds. Translated by Adachi Yasuchi
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the individual’s rights to participation and expression cultivated the learning the people needed
to have to uphold a modern nation-state. Opposite of Katō’s stance, memorialists argued that not
using participation as the method of education would undermine the legitimacy and stability of
the state. Tsuda added that Americans and Englishmen are truly free because their freedom of
speech and conduct prevents them from depriving others of these freedoms because they attach
so much value to their own rights to said freedoms.18 Memorialists like Tsuda took the position
that if individuals have more agency within the community, they are more likely to want to
uphold those rights for others, as well as the stability of the authority that grants and projects
those freedoms.
What did this disagreement between intellectuals mean for the legal parameters and goals
of the Charter Oath? Line four of the Charter Oath claimed that the Meiji State based policies on
the “just laws of Nature.” The reference to “laws of Nature” was the same type of language and
reasoning that appeared in the Constitutions of many Western nation-states. There is something
unnatural about this version of “nature” despite the implication that these “laws” are an
organically occurring way to organize a nation-state. The disagreement among the Meiji Six
scholars highlighted the contradiction embedded in this concept that so many nation-states laid
claim to as a source of legitimizing authority. There is a contradiction in the true laws of nature
because the “truth” those laws depend on is something that an external force must create in the
people rather than something occurring in nature. The memorialists and gradualists of the Meiji
Six Society provided different solutions to the question of how to define the public in relation to
the state. However, both of their solutions involved developing the public in terms of national
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spirit, unity, and education. Is “nature” still natural if it is something that must be taught, rather
than something intrinsic to the people? Furthermore, different versions of what various parts of
the public considered “just” or “natural” boiled underneath Meiji state’s attempts to create a
unified national identity. The state provided an initial language of “nation,” but in handing that
language to the public, the people could take it and transform or reinterpret it.
II. Resistance and the Dialogue of Disagreement
In 1877, the Meiji state experienced a challenge to its attempts to define the relation
between individuals and the state. That challenge was the Satsuma Rebellion. While Meiji statemakers worked on how to progress away from the Tokugawa Bakufu, that progression
threatened to leave certain groups behind. The fall of the Tokugawa Bakufu marked the end of
the samurai class as the oligarchs of the nation. Those samurai did not disappear despite Meiji
state leader attempting to break with the past. 20,000 former samurai led by Saigō Takamori
revolted against the Meiji State. Saigō had previously assisted in the creation of the Meiji state,
but fractures occurred when Saigō became estranged from the agendas of Meiji state leaders.19
While Meiji state-leaders were abroad, Saigō advocated for an invasion of Korea to demonstrate
Japan’s military strength and the value of the samurai class as protectors of Japan’s polity.20
State leaders opposed the plan to invade Korea, denying Saigō and his followers the
opportunity to prove the place of the samurai class in Meiji Japan.21 The former samurai fell into
the gap between the ghost of the Tokugawa Bakufu, and the Meiji State’s attempts to shape the
relationship of the people to “nation.” When there appears to be no place left for any given
group, they meet the mortality of their specific way of life. That pressure builds until three
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possible outcomes remain; assimilate to the new conditions, carve out a space to exist, or
ultimately disappear. Saigō Takamori and his followers attempted option two. Attacking the
Meiji state offered the opportunity to potentially destroy the forces that appeared to be choking
the samurai class. The Meiji state’s prescription of “laws of nature” felt unnatural to Saigō and
his followers. Thus, they resisted the attempts of the state to dictate a version of Japan, and what
it meant to be Japanese, that failed to represent how they related to their community. The
Satsuma Rebellion sought to redefine that relationship or break it off trying.
The Satsuma Rebellion failed with Saigō and many of his followers dead by the end of it.
The rebellion’s failure succeeded in capturing a specific moment in defining the Meiji state’s
version of identity and nation. While the Meiji state counted it as a victory for the Enlightenment
ideals of reason and progress over the backwardness of feudalism, others had a different view.
With Saigō, a sense of possibility that had characterized Meiji politics seemed to die too.22 Saigō
embodied a collective of dissenting voices from high and low. Historian Mark J. Ravina wrote,
“Saigō represented an alternative to a statist, bureaucratic, and centralizing vision of modern
Japan. An implausible range of critics, from proponents of Rousseau’s social contract to
defenders of samurai tradition, identified with Saigō s rebellion and mourned his death as a
triumph of autocracy.”23 It was ironic that the Meiji state claimed to value public assembly and
discussion, yet sections of its public saw the steps state-makers took to create a sense of “nation”
as the marks of autocracy. That tension turned Saigō Takamori’s defeat into a symbol greater
than the death of one man. His death became the triumph of the Meiji state and a serious blow to
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Mark J. Ravina. "The Apocryphal Suicide of Saigō Takamori: Samurai, "Seppuku", and the Politics of Legend."
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23
Ibid

14

the chorus of dissenting voices.24 The resistance of the Satsuma Rebellion demonstrated that
state methods of encouraging a particular relationship between individuals and the community of
nation ran the risk of alienating the very people the state needed to serve as its public.25
When a source of authority creates a model identity as a tool for maintaining
sovereignty, it opens the door for attempts to break that mold. By outlining the roles of Japanese
people in the Meiji state, the Meiji state gave the public a tangible target to wrestle with. For
example, proponents of Rousseau's philosophy took Western ideology and turned it back on the
Meiji state, while defenders of the samurai tradition leveled Japan’s past as a weapon. The
Satsuma Rebellion challenged the Meiji state’s ability to hold onto the power it had consolidated
after the end of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Specifically, a group of the individuals that state leaders
tried to incorporate into their public, broke away from both the legal and theoretical definitions
that worked to bind individuals and community.
The writers of the Charter Oath had tried to separate the people and national memory
from the Tokugawa Bakufu by charging it with participating in “evil customs of the past.” The
consequences of community versus exclusion underlying that language were not enough to sway
the participants of the Satsuma Rebellion. Conversely, the repeated attempts to push the people
towards a new national identity backfired by driving a wedge between the state and those who
still tied a large part of their identity to the remains of the Tokugawa Bakufu. That split in the
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relationship between individual and state demonstrated another contradiction embedded in the
making of a modern nation-state. The state needed to create a public for the nation but the same
processes intended to create a collectivity in that public ran the risk of breeding disunity. That
disunity then called on another step in the state-building process: the monopolization of violence.
The Meiji State’s imperial army suppressed the Satsuma Rebellion with violence after a
five-month struggle.26 This type of armed violence was an extension of the rhetorical violence
alluded to in political policies. Rebellion provided a tangible example of why state leaders staked
a claim in ensuring that the agency of individuals only went so far. The imperial army defeated
the alternative versions of national identity that Saigō and his men represented, and by extension,
the Meiji state furthered its control over both violence and identity. The imperial army overtook
the violence of the Satsuma Rebellion, thus forwarding the ideology that the state was the key
negotiator in regards to national identity. The public did not have the right to exert that same
pressure. By successfully putting down the Satsuma Rebellion, the Meiji state once again
showed its commitment to separating the people from their former or alternative versions of
national identity, even if gaining that control over Japanese subjectivity required the deaths of
those seen as disrupting the goal of unity. With the Charter Oath’s intentions and resistance to
the Meiji state both on the table, state leaders needed to create another bridge between the
community of nation and the individuals within it.
Twelve years after the Satsuma Rebellion, the Meiji State promulgated its Constitution in
1889. A constitution serves as a contract between the nation and its people. Additionally, writing
a constitution was one of the processes Meiji State leaders had considered while traveling
abroad. State leaders intended for the Constitution to tie together ideologies from abroad with the
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specific needs of Japan to address the tensions that still needed ironing out. One cannot overlook
that writing a constitution is inherently about control. It depends on the success of legally
defining a public in a manner that causes that public to self-identify with the state-prescribed
identity. Statesman Itō Hirobumi served as the central figure in developing the constitution.27 He
claimed, “I, for one, am convinced that now is the time to make unprecedented reforms and that
conditions are already ripe for them… In politics it is best to adopt methods that fit changing
circumstance.”28 The Meiji state had already issued the Charter Oath in 1868 which defined the
goals and values of the state. Then the state experienced resistance to its ideals during the
Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. By 1889, state leaders needed to double down on their goal of
weaving the public and their idea of “nation” together.
The writing process highlighted the same conflict that appeared in the Meiji Six Journals.
All writers agreed that the imperial institution should remain intact and that an assembly was
necessary. Gradualists favored a more limited legislature (similar to Germany), with the main
focus on a system for developing Japan’s “national essence.”29 After experiencing resistance,
state leaders raised the stakes on what it meant to be a citizen of Japan. Historian Carol Gluck
referenced Taiyo 3, no. 20 arguing, “that ‘just being born and raised in this country is not enough
for the masses to be considered citizens (kokumin). The prerequisite for citizenship is a sound
sense of nation (kokkateki kannen),’ without which the people remain ‘unpatriots’ (hikokumin),
and the nation endangered.”30 Different sides of the Constitutional debate fought over what type
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of governmental structure would work best to instill that national essence in the people. The
popular rights side (in line with the Meiji Six’s memorialists) wanted to introduce a British-style
democracy with a two-chambered assembly and cabinet.31 Furthermore, the debate that went into
deciding on the details of the Constitution meant that a vital piece of creating a modern nationstate came from the act of arguing over what precisely constituted the national essence the Meiji
state wanted. The debates of the Meiji Six Society and writers of the Constitution, combined
with dissenting voices of the Satsuma Rebellion, demonstrated the vastness of the experiences
that existed behind the veil of a single unified public. The Constitution of 1889 served as one
document intended to bridge (and control) the multiplicity of identities that grated against
attempts to create one definition of the relationship between the public and their national
community.
The very first lines of the Constitution of 1889 laid out the legitimacy of state authority,
and the intention to influence and develop the people for the collective benefit of the nation. The
preamble states, “Having by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a
lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give
development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects.... and hoping to
maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support.”32
Similar to the Charter Oath, writers emphasized unity between the public and the state. This
pattern was not specific to just Japan. For example, the Constitution of the German Empire 1871
stated: “For the whole of Germany one common nationality exists with the effect that every
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person (subject, State citizen) belonging to any one of the federated States…”33 Given the
Iwakura Mission’s visit to Germany (and other Western nations) the Meiji Constitution writers’
use of a similar type of collective language showed a pattern. The Iwakura Mission member’s
goal of collecting information on state-building tactics highlighted that Japan was not the only
nation that needed to walk the line between a modern nation-state’s monopoly on violence and
the rights of individuals. One of the most tried methods for convincing individuals to identify
with the needs and desires of their community is to appeal to the benefits of being a part of “us”
instead of “them.”
Furthermore, the Meiji Constitution stated the state’s goal of developing the moral and
intellectual faculties of the subjects to achieve that unity. The writers’ appeal to a collective
effort towards the benefit of the state not only asked for unity, but it implied the consequences of
standing out of that unity. If one was not a part of the community that worked towards the
betterment of the nation, then they were an obstacle to that goal. Such obstacles, namely
alternative versions of national identity, posed a risk to the collectivist mentally that the Meiji
state wished to install as a vital part of belonging to the nation. The Satsuma Rebellion twelve
years prior provided a still memorable example of what happens when a group of subjects
becomes too forceful with an alternative version of what it meant to be a Japanese subject. The
connection between the Meiji state’s goals, dissenting voices, and the desire to bridge that gap,
grappled with contradictions embedded in the process of state-making. While those
contradictions also appear in intellectual debate and literature, they come up even within the
Meiji State’s policy.
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A key contradiction was the balancing act between the state’s authority and its role in
guaranteeing individual freedoms. The Constitution stated that, within the limit of the law,
Japanese subjects have the rights to freedom of speech and writing, association, publication, and
public meetings.34 The inclusion of “within the limit of the law” gave State leaders an out if the
liberties given to the public became too unruly. Yet at the same time, the promise of those
freedoms served to reinforce the goal of unity. It allowed subjects to feel as though the
community helped project their voices. State leaders offered subjects the choice to use writing,
speech, debate, etc. to navigate how they related to other individuals and the community of
nation. The state’s power, as codified in the Constitution, hinged on its control of violence.
Simultaneously, however, the state rooted its legitimacy in these new claims about the condition
and freedoms of the individual. There is a paradoxical relationship between desiring a united
identity and opening an avenue for a plurality of different dialogues about that relation. The
individual had to have the ability to freely navigate his/her relation to the community, but the
state leaders could not allow the discussion surrounding that navigation to splinter the ideals the
Meiji state set out.
III. Education and the Relationship between Knowledge and Morals
One way that Meiji state leaders attempted balance that tension was precisely as the
preamble of the Constitution stated: developing the moral and intellectual faculties of the public.
A vital method to drive that development was education.35 Education created a means of
disseminating the state’s code of civil morality to the people. State leaders intended for the
popularization of this education to help shift the intellectual and moral foundations of the people
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into something easily utilized for state benefit. Previously in 1872, writers of the Preamble to the
Fundamental Code of Education repeated the practice of separating the public from the past by
referring to the traditions and policies of the Tokugawa era as something, “...that impeded the
spread of culture, hampered the development of talent and accomplishments, and sowed the
seeds of poverty, bankruptcy, and disrupted homes.”36 State leaders took very tangible
consequences (poverty, bankruptcy, etc) and offered education as a means of avoiding said
consequences. Still, that measure was not enough to gain unity and control of the public, as seen
by the Meiji Six Society’s debates and the Satsuma Rebellion. The 1872 Education Code used a
combination of consequences and tying all aspects of human activity (everything from military
affairs to daily communication) to education. By 1890, state leaders took a different approach
that focused directly on combining intellectual and moral faculties into a civil morality.
Meiji state leaders promulgated the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. Gluck
describes the origins of the document as, “The origin of the Rescript, or more properly, of the
civil morality it epitomized, was the premise that national education should serve the state.”37
The Meiji state’s overtures towards creating a specific national identity required the success of
popularizing “civil morality” through the educational system. The opening of the Rescript on
Education encouraged subjects to:
... pursue learning and cultivate the arts and thereby develop
intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public
good and promote common interests; always respect the constitution and
observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourself to the state (giyu ko
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ni hoshi); and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our imperial throne
coeval with heaven and earth.38
State leaders presented the development of moral and intellectual faculties as something intended
to serve the good of the public and the individuals that made up that public. The wording of the
appeal encouraged individuals to think of themselves as sharing common interests with other
members of the community. The Imperial Rescript on Education suggested that sharing common
interests benefitted the everyone, thus implying that interests not part of that commonality were
detrimental to the well-being of individuals and state alike. The language of “common”
forwarded the collectivism of a national identity that state leaders desired. Additionally, the
Imperial Rescript on Education demanded adherence to the constitution and all laws, as well as
giving up oneself in service of the state (should it be necessary).
Civil morality depended on individuals identifying themselves with the community of
nation to the point of sacrificing parts of one’s agency. Philosopher Ōnishi Hajime (1864-1900)
identified a conflict between the demands of civil morality in the Rescript and the individual
freedoms promised in other legal documents. Historian Richard M. Reitan summarized Ōnishi’s
argument that, “...if proper moral action lies solely in obedience to a command, without that
command to obey or disobey, there can be no morality… and if the state succeeded in making
the entire population ‘moral,’ then none could be both moral and free…”39 This was one more
example of the challenge of negotiating freedom and authority. If the state’s singularity of
morals succeeded, then the state undermined its own claims of individual freedoms. The state
tried to teach “morality” as obedience, but that definition failed to capture the various other
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forces that impact one’s sense of “morality.”
Education and morality continued to raise concerns as even those in favor of the Westernstyle learning the Meiji state favored had doubts over its consequences. Historian Thomas Haven
writes, “One of the pressing questions facing the Western-oriented educator in restoration Japan
was that of personal morality.”40 Recalling the Constitution’s claim of developing intellectual
and moral faculties, the challenge at hand becomes apparent. The meeting of intellectualism and
morality itself posed a problem. Developing the intellectual faculties of the individual risked
granting the public the tools to criticize the moral faculties that the state wanted to instill. The
state provided a legal language of “nation” and the morals that should accompany membership in
that nation, however, the public still had the power to turn that language against itself. Why was
it so difficult to impact different sides of individuals at once?
For one, intellectuals disagreed on the nature of the individual as part of the state. A brief
return to the Meiji Six Society reveals that first challenge. Specifically, the Meiji Six Society’s
argument identified the issue with influencing intellectual faculties; that if “truth” as in the “laws
of Nature” does not function universally then the transfer of knowledge runs the risk of
undermining the authority that implements it. Those intellectual faculties were not the only
concern though. Another key piece was how intellectual development influenced morality. The
relationship between those different parts of the individual related to the relationship between the
agency of the individual and the authority of the state because of the role both knowledge and
morality played in trying to create unity.
In his early 1900s essays, intellectual and author Takayama Chogyū analyzed exactly
why attempts to influence the nature of the people were so difficult. While Chogyū did not write
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directly in response to the Satsuma Rebellion or the Constitution of 1889, the fact that he wrote
about these tensions after both of these events is significant. It indicated that the tensions that
had sparked the Satsuma Rebellion had not disappeared, nor had the Constitution of 1889 or
Imperial Rescript on Education successfully created adherence to a singular national identity. 41
Chogyū problematized two cornerstones of state authority: “truth,” and the relationship between
intellectual and moral development. To explore those issues, Chogyū split consciousness into
three sections.
First, consciousness of truth, which stated that mutual exchange creates knowledge
through the consensus of different subjects, thus creating an objective standard. Importantly, the
concept “truth” is something that people must produce, rather than a self-evident reality.
Additionally, forces outside of the individual (such as the state) can influence the knowledge of
individuals by encouraging mutual acknowledgment of a proposed “truth,” be this truth that of
nation, citizen, etc. Once the community establishes what constitutes knowledge, that knowledge
serves as the standard by which individuals judge other ideas and information.42 Next in
Chogyū’s theory is aesthetic pleasure, which is based on feelings/taste, making it absolute for the
individual experiencing it, and tying it intimately to self-consciousness.43 That individuality of
experience highlights an awareness of the self rather than a focus on a mutual standard. Aesthetic
pleasure comes from the single subject’s awareness of its own feelings, while knowledge comes
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from the way one subject’s perception of what is true overlaps with others subjects to affirm that
knowledge.44 There is another overlap though, “moral consciousness.”
Morality functions through a mutually constructed understanding of what good or bad is,
and the consequences of it. It serves as an objective standard through which people judge
themselves and others. Morality also requires self-awareness, the same kind of absolute reality of
that self-consciousness seen in the tastes of aesthetic pleasures. Chogyū demonstrated that an
external force like the law cannot change the highly subjectivity personal tastes of individuals,
which makes up part of their moral consciousness. The problem of influencing subjective taste,
combined with the fact that the state’s attempts to create a single version of “knowledge” stood
on a foundation of disagreement rather than a unified consensus, demonstrated that influence
comes from multiple competing sources. Thus, the state could not gain full control over the
moral faculties of its public. The Imperial Rescript on Education offered the state as one
purveyor of morality, but Chogyū showed that morality is much slipperier than just a command
or common interests. Morality depends on the individual’s own tastes/feelings as much as it
depends on a shared base of knowledge with community members. Chogyū summarized,
While at the same time feeling the absoluteness of its own
consciousness when facing its innerside, moral consciousness recognizes the
objective standards to be obeyed when looking from the outside…. moral
consciousness includes two principles - subjectivity and objectivity - that are
opposite principles. To worry about, to feel reverence for, and to cooperate
toward the unification and harmonization of both, this is the moral activity of
humanity.45
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Morality itself consists of oppositional forces, therefore, the state’s attempts to influence the
morality of the public had to contend with that friction. Between the conflict within the concept
of morality, and the conflict between “nation” and individual, any identity stemming from these
conversations contained those layers of opposition. The desire to create a national identity relied
on trying to harmonize opposites, just like objectivity and subjectivity in Chogyū’s theory. The
result was that neither intellectual nor moral development contained one true path like state
rhetoric suggested. Rather, both of these elements fundamentally depended on oppositional
forces.
Through the tensions between the State’s attempts to define the people and the
intellectual responses to that definition, one can see the rejection of modern “truth” as something
self-sufficient. People create truth, which means that no one truth is universally applicable.
Instead of a single modern “truth,” different intentions and interpretations defined themselves
both in reference to and in resistance of each other. Chogyū’s work echoed an intellectual trend
of questioning the foundations of truth and morality. Famously, Friedrick Nietzsche struck at
truth as man-made metaphor used to generalize differences.46 Nietzsche also argued that a sense
of morality occurred through socialization to it, with people collectively judging themselves and
others.47 This intellectual trend emerged precisely because truth and morality served as
mediators of the relationship between state and individuals in Japan and abroad. These tensions
demonstrated that opposition underlined every faculty the Meiji state attempted to utilize for a
national essence. Any sense of national identity that did emerged came from the conversation
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between opposing forces (knowledge, taste, morality, etc), not one force subsuming the others.
IV. The Literary Mirror
Popular novelists of the time like Natsume Sōseki and Mori Ōgai also represented the
tension between the state’s influence and authority versus the agency of the individual in their
writings. Literary production in the Meiji era started off slowly, but it began to build rapidly as
translations of European works sparked Japanese writers’ interest. Meiji era literature took on the
unique position of both incorporating elements of Western literary techniques, and “returns” to
Japanese traditions.48 Literature served as another meeting place for the tensions between state
and individual, in addition to the friction between Western ideology and Japanese tradition.
While the Meiji State wanted to create a particular base of knowledge breaking from the
“backward” past, the high literacy rate (a result of educational policy) also opened the floodgates
on literature as a vehicle for alternative narratives of the relationship between people and their
community. The combination of returns to tradition with new literary forms highlighted how the
literary realm attempted to reconcile the tensions playing out in the social and political spheres.
Ōgai and Sōseki’s work served as a reflection of how people navigated the forces that
contributed to their recognition of ideas like “self” and “nation.”
Natsume Sōseki (1896-1916) focused on themes such as the conflict between the
collectivism in the mentality of “nation,” versus the agency of the individual. Sōseki studied
English literature abroad and noticed that famous works, such as those by Shakespeare, did not
contain the universality that Europeans claimed they did.49 That realization coincided with
Sōseki’s belief that importing Western ideologies to help shape a unified national identity in
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Japan created an uneasy relationship with the freedom of individuals to negotiate their own
relationship between their self and their nation. To summarize, historian Donald Keene wrote,
“His outlook differed also from that of Japanese of his day who justified their studies of Western
learning in terms of service to the nation; he insisted that the purpose of education as to ‘develop
inborn ability and cultivate one’s natural moral nature.’”50 Debates over education highlighted
education as a tool to benefit the state and the collective identity that state leaders desired. Sōseki
reframed education and knowledge as a means of promoting the agency of the individual.
Sōseki’s writing emphasized the contradictions within the methods the Meiji state utilized to
achieve its goals.
In his 1905-7 novel, I Am a Cat, Sōseki’s feline narrator mocked Meiji society, namely
the uneasy balance between Japanese traditions and imported Western ideologies. For example,
the cat is highly critical of the conceited nature of human knowledge. It says, “And you should
wish to learn about cats, only a cat can tell you. Humans, however advanced, can tell you
nothing on this subject. As inasmuch humans are, in fact far less advanced than they fancy
themselves.”51 Through this barb, Sōseki’s cat indicates the problem with trying to apply any
given ideology as if it were universal. British, American, or German political structures could not
precisely fit the experience of the Japanese subject. Just as only a “cat” can teach one all there is
to know about felines, only the experience of Japanese individuals could reveal the specific
nature of the relationship between the Meiji state and its public. Sōseki gestured to the fact that
Meiji state leaders’ attempts to teach the public about themselves (i.e. to influence the nature of
each individual in terms of knowledge and morality) did not create unity, rather state leaders
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attempted to smother dissenting voices under the illusion of a singular nation identity.
In a similar vein Sōseki’s cat says of its master, “Like an ill-natured oyster, he secrets
himself in his study and has never once opened his mouth to the outside world. And to see him
there looking as though he alone has truly attained enlightenment, is enough to make a cat
laugh.”52 In this instance the schoolteacher played the role of the Meiji state, demonstrating the
illusion that the state alone held the knowledge of how individuals and the state should interact.
Sōseki’s critique emphasized a point Chogyū made, that knowledge becomes an objective
standard only through mutual exchange. The State could not claim any truth derived from
knowledge, if that knowledge did not ever engage with that of the individuals the state presided
over. Crafting a specific Japanese subjectivity appeared much simpler if one kept alternative
versions closed off behind discourses like “rebellion,” “ignorance,” and evil traditions.” Even
though Meiji state makers did attempt to fit and curate Western ideologies for Japan, Sōseki’s
criticism echoed the criticisms of dissenting voices who charged the Meiji State with autocracy,
despite its supposed value of ideas of assembly and public discussion.
Mori Ōgai (1862-1922) struck at the same tension Soseki noticed, but he approached it a
little differently. Ōgai received training in Confucianism and martial arts and traveled to
Germany to continue his studies of medicine.53 The diversity of Ōgai’s experience is reminiscent
of how Ōgai navigated the relationship between individuals and community in his writing.
Karatani Kōjin summarized Ōgai’s style as, “In Ōgai’s writing the “self” has no substance, it is
an ‘assemblage of threads pulled together from different directions,’ precisely what Marx
prescribed in The German Ideology as ‘a totality of diverse relationships.”54 While I agree with
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Karatani’s claim that Ōgai created his characters by pulling together a variety of experiences, I
disagree that the self has “no substance” in Ōgai’s work. The “self” acquires substance from the
“diverse relationships” pulled together to make that character. That process of acquisition
reflected the ways individuals shaped their identity in reference to their relationship with the
authority of the state and their community. All the tensions laid out in the political and
intellectual documents took up residence within individuals through their interaction with their
environment. Ōgai’s novels allowed readers to watch the friction between individuals and
outside relationships play out in a manner that spoke to the underlying contradictions involved in
making a modern nation-state.
In 1911, Ōgai began serially publishing The Wild Geese. The novel is set in 1880 and
contains three important characters. Otama, the mistress of Suezō, who entered the arrangement
because Suezō agreed to provide for her father. Next is Suezō, an already married money-lender.
Finally, the main character is Okada, a medical student who first notices Otama when he is
taking a walk.55 Ōgai’s main character, Okada, is not, however, the greatest interest in the novel.
Instead, Ōgai built his literary world around the places where different characters and symbols
intersect. Those points of interaction demonstrated how power, authority, and individuality
always worked in relation to others.
For example, at the beginning of The Wild Geese Otama has very little agency. She
defines her identity through her desire to help her father, and through Suezō’s possession of her.
She admits it is humiliating to “belong” to a moneylender like Suezō, but more so than that she
“...had such a sense, it was that of the unfairness of her own destiny. She had done nothing
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wrong, yet she was to be persecuted by the world.”56 In this line Otama characterizes her
identity as one lacking agency, however, it is relations with others that impose that
powerlessness. Otama is not without power on her own, rather she is without power in
comparison to other forces and subjects. Namely, her societal duty to be filial to her father that
presses her to enter the engagement with Suezō. The same way Otama feels ensnared by her
arrangement with Suezō, individuals’ relationship to “nation” places them in a similar kind of
arrangement. The Meiji state promoted a specific type of identity (and accompanying morality
and base of knowledge) that became a contract with the public through the codification of power
presented in the Constitution. The arrangement between the state as the authority of nation and
the individual, placed the individual in a position of being relatively weak compared to the state.
The state leaders decided upon the laws, knowledge, and morals that the public should be held
accountable for. As the public engaged with that dialogue, whether by resistance or adherence,
they embedded those values within themselves. By interacting with both state authority and the
concept of “nation,” individuals defined themselves in part through how they interpreted the
balanced the relation between their power as one “self” versus the power of the state.
That arrangement of power was not, however, entirely static. Although the Meiji state
leaders attempted to monopolize violence, their difficulty in gaining complete control over a
single national identity left room for divergence. The diverse relationships that constitute the self
and its subjectivity do not engage once and then vanish. They continuously affect those they are
in contact with. Even relations bound up in political and legal control were flexible.
Returning to The Wild Geese, Otama learns how to use others from the same relations
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that used her. Despite her earlier lamentation of her lack of agency, she figures out how to
manipulate her place within the community for her own benefit. She learned to “buy” her
neighbors by exchanging things like food for copybooks to practice writing.57 Additionally,
Otama ceases to treat Suezō as if she owed him gratitude or affection. That change came after a
particular realization, “She would be with him in the room, but her real self was detached,
watching the scene from the side. And there it would deride first Suezo and then the other Otama
for being under his control.”58 It is important that Otama references a split in her “self.” She
critiques both Suezō, who has helped define her relation to herself, and the part of her that
“allows” for that control. Furthermore, Otama identifies that there are different layers of her
“self.” She is one person, but she contains the traces of different influences. This process is not
only applicable to Ogai’s novel. It works in regards to national identity. The state affected the
people’s subjectivity through the relationship between the government and its citizens. The
Constitution, education policies and other legal institutions defined parts of each individual's
“self” in relation to the state. However, neither the state nor individuals could claim their identity
separate from the other.
One of the most striking scenes of The Wild Geese drives home the connection between
state authority and individual freedom. The scene centers on a snake forcing itself into a bird
cage and eating one bird. Ōgai wrote, “...the bird had not been alone. The mate to the one
fluttering about was trapped in the snake’s mouth.”59 The snake is the creature in control of
violence, however, it is only able to capture one of the two birds. While the snake holds one bird
in its mouth, the other bird is still flying around. Just as Otama implied her identity contained
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multiple parts, the two birds mirror that. Even when part of an individual's identity remains stuck
in the jaws of state authority, another part of that same identity is the bird that remains uncaught.
The tensions behind “truth,” “nature,” and the power of the state versus the freedom of the
individual, made it impossible for the Meiji state to completely swallow the real multiplicity of
national identity.
The clarity of conflict as a theme in literature shows that the modern condition was not
simply the creation of a modern state with modern subjects, but the connected process founded
on fighting over questions of what makes a public, how does the State exert control, and what
type of “truth” exists when everything sits on a moving foundation. Trying to create any sort of
true identity relies on the inherent disagreement and diversity of forces pushing and pulling on
each other. The universality that Meiji state leaders tried to find with their policies was never the
singular identity they depicted, rather, the universal was the plurality of tensions and forces.
V. Final Connections
The plurality that appeared in everything from politics to literature created a condition
where all the possible outcomes, future fascism or otherwise, were a part of the same coin. One
can flip that coin over and over again and get different results because of the dynamic nature of
the tensions under the surface of the making of a modern nation-state. The continuity from
Charter Oath of 1868 through the early twentieth-century novels of Ōgai and Sōseki did not stem
from the unanimous triumph of one national identity, or a linear progression towards
“modernity.” Instead, what remained consistent were the questions asked and the debates fought.
The presumption of Meiji state leaders that a national essence was vital to progress
carried with it a tangled network of ideologies and counter-ideologies. What does “nation” mean
to the individual? How do freedom and authority exist together? What function does claiming
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any sort of truth-based knowledge serve when truth itself is not simply objective, but subjective
as well? These questions underscored the challenges inherent in crafting a modern nation-state.
The fighting that went into answering those questions consisted of fighting with opposing views
more so than fighting against. For example, state policy intended to cultivate faithful subjects
emerged alongside the alternative subjectivities that the state wanted to suppress.60 Wrestling
over what constituted an ideal Japanese subject relied on alternative versions of that subject to
conceptualize what the ideal identity of citizens should look like. The Charter Oath of 1868
relied on the practices and policies of the Tokugawa Bakufu as a point of contrast to define the
emergence of the Meiji state. The Constitution of 1889 relied on friction between individuals and
the state to insert itself as a bridge between the two. The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890)
needed differing opinions on morality and knowledge to assert state leaders’ version as the
correct interpretation.
It may sound counterintuitive that the state-building process required tension, but the
creation of the modern nation-state rests on navigating the relationship between state authority
and individual freedom. The Meiji state legitimated itself both through its harnessing of power
and violence, and its promotion of individual rights and freedoms. These two sides are inherently
contradictory, yet they both served as foundations of the modern nation-state. The conflict
between individual and state, single or multiple, and truth and the absence of it created the
conversation that actually built what it meant to be a Japanese subject in the Meiji Era. Without
the plurality of voices, there would not have been the driving force required to create the
dynamic state of national and individual identity. Politicians, intellectuals, authors, and the
general public each contributed to those identities because they worked within the sphere of
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thought. Political policy responded to the needs of the state for unity, but in doing so sparked
opposition. Intellectual debate challenged how one defines the public in service of the nation,
and how truth and morality converge in support or resistance of that definition. Literature
mirrored the conflicts of lived-experience in a manner that highlighted how the foundations of
nation and identity are relational. Not only were politics, intellectualism, and literature
connected, they all embodied different sides of the same dialogue that defined the transitions of
the Meiji period.
Additional research concerning public responses would further how one understands the
relationship between public and nation. This project focused specifically on the interplay of
forces within Japan to demonstrate how plurality is the foundation of the nation-state, but another
possibility for further work is a greater focus on international relations. The foundation of the
modern nation-state is too often taken for granted, and exposing the different layers and
contradictions within it allows one to analyze how the relationship between public and state
changes and develops throughout different periods and conditions. It is this relationship that
continues to inform the interaction between people, community, and nation around the globe in
the present moment.
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